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SOME WORRIES ABOUT SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
WILLIAM T. PIzzi*
As a resident of a non-guidelines state and an admitted novice
on state sentencing guidelines, I find myself uncertain about the
wisdom and the practicality of guidelines. I have to admit to an
initial attraction to the idea of a sentencing commission that would
have the experience, talent, and time to look at what is happening
in sentencing on a statewide basis. A commission that could force
citizens, the legislature, and the courts to face some of the hard
choices that need to be made if we are to use our limited correc-
tional resources wisely. Kay Knapp's paper' convinces me that
there is much that a state like Colorado could learn from a
comprehensive examination of our sentencing statutes and prac-
tices. I also recognize that judges exercise tremendous power in
sentencing, that there are problems of widely disparate sentences
for similar crimes and similar defendants, 2 and that guidelines may
help alleviate some of the disparities. Starting the task of sentencing
a defendant with a.clear, empirically-based understanding of what
a typical case in the particular crime category looks like3 and then
working from that typical case to determine what features of the
crime at hand are typical or atypical, may improve the sentencing
process considerably.
Nevertheless, I am nervous about starting down the guidelines
path. My initial reservation has nothing to do with guidelines per
se, but stems from our experience with the criminal justice system's
pretrial and trial procedures. When you look at the American legal
system, one particular weakness sets us apart from every other
western system of law with which I am acquainted: we are pro-
cedure addicts. I realize that some prefer to express our obsession
with procedures in a positive light. They might rather term it a
deep concern for rights that admittedly stresses procedures. But I
prefer to be honest-it's an addiction. Procedure for us is like
potato chips to some or chocolate to the author-once we start
* Professor, University of Colorado; A.B., 1965, Holy Cross College; M.A. (Phi-
losophy), 1971, University of Massachusetts; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School.
1. See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 679 (1993).
2. See MR wIN FRANKEL, CRImm. SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
3. Knapp, supra note 1, at 691-95.
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we cannot stop. In that case wisdom tells me, maybe it is better
not to start at all. Almost any area that we begin to proceduralize
gets lost in a maze of distinctions and subtleties that take us far
from our initial purposes. Look, for example, at Fourth Amend-
ment law. The standard treatise on search and seizure' runs to
four volumes on that area of procedure alone. Or consider the
confessions area-is there anyone who honestly thinks that police
officers can possibly understand the implications for interrogation
to be drawn from an arrestee's invocation of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel as opposed to the invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel?5 And what about jury selection which has
blossomed from a rather sleepy little procedure into an ordeal that
often lasts as long as an entire trial in other countries and is full
of fascinating tactical and legal issues?6 And, of course, there is
always our system of evidence with its ritualistic incantations, its
whispered sidebar conferences, and its subtle limiting instructions
to the jury.
I don't question the objectives of any of these areas of law.
But the lesson I draw from our pretrial and trial system is that
all too often procedures take on a life of their own that end up
piling distinction upon distinction until we reach a level of so-
phistication that itself becomes a problem. With respect to our
trial system, the result has been a system that is too complicated,
too expensive, and, quite frankly, too fragile to be used regularly
to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent. Both Judge Frankel
and Professor Orland in their paper observe that our penal laws
are extremely harsh when compared to those in other western
countries.8 I agree, but would add the additional observation that
4. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987).
5. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675 (1988); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) with McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111
S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
6. See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the
Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 155 ("If one wanted to understand how the American
trial system for criminal cases came to be the most expensive and time-consuming in the
world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point than Batson."). See also Albert
W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 157-63 (1989).
7. One can probably tell from these criticisms of our trial system that the author is
more impressed with Judge Frankel's criticisms of the adversary system and the uncom-
fortable role of the judge in that system (see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE
(1980); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975)) than with Judge Frankel's work on sentencing (see FRANKEL, supra note 2).
8. See Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation about Sentencing
Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 658, 660 (1993).
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our system of criminal procedure is also at an extreme compared
to other western countries. I do not think it is purely a coincidence.
It is from knowledge of our addiction to procedure and past
experiences with procedures that were also initially simple and
straightforward that I end up being nervous about the guidelines
movement. We do not have a light touch when it comes to
procedure. I realize that advocates of state guidelines take great pains
to distinguish their efforts from the complex and rather mechanistic
federal model. 9 They assure us that state guidelines systems usually
leave judges with more discretion than is available to federal judges
and usually permit departures from the guidelines more easily than
is true in the federal system. But even if those claims are accurate,
procedures in our system too often gather their own momentum
and take us down sideroads from which it is sometimes hard to
find our way back. One fear I have is that guidelines will lead to
more and more pressure to turn sentencing into an adversary, trial-
type hearing. Perhaps we have already reached that point or, more
accurately, assumed that point. Lost in the debate over which
aggravating factors 0 must be proven by the government at the
sentencing hearing and by what standard of proof," is the changing
nature of sentencing itself that is assumed. Unlike our trial system,
which is a battle between the adversaries with the judge playing a
neutral and passive role, sentencing has always seemed to be highly
inquisitorial in nature. It is the judge, working through probation,
who develops the background facts on the offense and the of-
fender. It is the judge who runs the sentencing proceeding. It is
the judge to whom and with whom the defendant speaks prior to
sentencing. And, finally, it is the judge who has the obligation to
impose a sentence that is fair and just. Judicial responsibility for
sentencing does not necessarily change just because a jurisdiction
has guidelines (or requires a judge to explain and justify a sentence
or permits appellate review). But, the more I read of the guidelines
literature and read discussions about the prosecutor's burden of
proof at sentencing, the more I see the nature of the sentencing
9. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 679-81; Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State
and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 679 (1992).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ekwunoh, No. 91-684, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 434, at
*11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1993) (government must prove at sentencing that the defendant
was aware of the amount of drugs he possessed, even though knowledge of the amount is
not an element of the crime of possession).
11. See, e.g., Steven M. Salky & Blair G. Brown, The Preponderance of Evidence
Standard at Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 907 (1992) (arguing that due process should
require proof of aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence).
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process and the responsibility of the sentencing judge as being
thrown into some confusion by guidelines.
Because I have a high respect for the civil law tradition in
which judges are active factfinders and have the responsibility for
deciding both guilt and any sentence, I am comfortable with the
strong role that judges have traditionally been assigned at sen-
tencing and would be reluctant to see that role altered signifi-
cantly. 12 I think it is very important in a system that is highly
adversarial that at some point the judge address the defendant
directly and take responsibility for the sentence imposed, whether
it be under a guidelines system or not.
There is another concern that I have about sentencing guide-
lines. I am concerned about the attempts to change the culture of
plea bargaining by placing limits on plea bargaining in guidelines
jurisdictions. If I understand Kay Knapp's paper, which makes
reference to limits on plea bargaining in some of the guidelines
jurisdictions, 3 these jurisdictions limit prosecutors to what seems
to be "charge" bargaining. This would permit the parties to agree
to a plea of a lesser included offense and hence a lower sentencing
range, but would not permit "sentence" bargains that would guar-
antee a defendant a certain sentence within the range set out for
that offense. This effort to restrict prosecutors to charge bargaining
troubles me. I am not an advocate of plea bargaining for its own
sake; I admire the way European countries have worked to limit
plea bargaining. But I start from the premise that plea bargaining
in state systems is inevitable in our tradition. And if we are going
to have plea bargaining, I prefer that the system be honest about
what it is doing. I prefer that prosecutors and defense attorneys
be open with judges about what they are proposing and why they
are proposing it. I realize that guidelines systems still permit plea
bargaining, but there are cases in which a prosecutor may wish to
have a defendant plead to a more serious offense with a guaranteed
sentence rather than have a defendant plead to an offense that is
not a fair description of the crime committed.
Charge bargaining has been the norm in the federal system
for some time. But I draw a sharp distinction between the federal
system and a state system, like Colorado's, in terms of the cases
12. 1 would not be at all reluctant to see the range of our criminal penalties at
sentencing significantly narrowed and the level of punishment in general significantly
reduced.
13. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 694-95.
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that are prosecuted and the way prosecutorial discretion is exer-
cised. The federal system is very conservative in terms of the cases
that it chooses to prosecute. By and large, if the prosecutors in
the federal system don't have an overwhelming case, they do not
file charges. You can do that when the victim is the United States
and when the crimes are overwhelmingly nonviolent. But when
you are dealing with crimes where there are victims, especially the
sorts of violent crimes that are all too common in local prosecutors'
offices-homicides, rapes, aggravated robberies, and the like-a
prosecutor cannot refuse to file criminal charges in this conservative
fashion. You cannot tell the parents of a young child who was
kidnapped and brutally raped that you are not going to file charges
against the perpetrator because there is a Michigan v. Jackson14
problem with the perpetrator's confession, or because you are
worried that the child's identification is impeachable because she
is young and wears thick glasses. The prosecutor has to file in
these sorts of cases and do the best he or she can, which will
usually mean getting the best plea bargain that can be worked out.
Maybe the prosecutor has to promise a given sentence at a sub-
stantial discount from the sentence that would be imposed if the
rapist were to be convicted at trial. There is no doubt that the
sentence may be less than the defendant deserved, but that is the
nature of plea bargaining.
My concern with restricting the ability of prosecutors and
defense attorneys to negotiate a plea bargain in a case like the
rape case I have hypothesized is partly a belief that state systems
need such flexibility. But it is also my belief that restricting the
plea bargaining ability of the parties leads to dishonesty in the
system. What seems to happen is that the prosecutor and the
defense lawyer try to achieve the same result as they would under
sentence bargaining by being very careful how the charge is de-
scribed to probation or to the court, or by failing to provide
certain information to the court in order to achieve a specific
sentence under the guidelines system." I think that keeping the
14. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). In Jackson, the Court suppressed the confession of a
defendant who had been given Miranda warnings and made incriminating statements at a
point in time after he had been arraigned and had asked for Sixth Amendment counsel,
because any waiver of his right had been waived. Id. at 636. The Court ruled that the
courtroom request for Sixth Amendment counsel brought the case "by analogy" within
the purview of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which forbids the police from
trying to reinterrogate a suspect who has once asked for counsel. Jackson, 475 U.S. at
636.
15. Ms. Knapp's paper details some of the problems in guidelines jurisdictions as
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judge uninformed of the nature of the plea bargain and working
"around the judge" to achieve a specific sentence is exactly op-
posite of the way that plea bargaining and sentencing should be
taking place. I much prefer a system in which a prosecutor is
honest about what the defendant did, what the plea bargain is,
and what the reasons are for the plea bargain. If the judge objects,
the judge can ask to see the police reports, push for changes in
the bargain, or even reject it. But if the judge accepts it, the judge
is at least prepared to address the crime honestly and is not basing
his or her sentence on information that everyone else in the court-
room knows to be inaccurate.
I realize that I am probably the only academic who would
argue in favor of more power for prosecutors in guidelines juris-
dictions. 6 But my point is not about power so much as it is about
honesty in the system. I believe that how a judge takes a plea,
how a judge talks to the prosecutor and the defense attorney in
discussing the plea, and how a judge talks with a defendant when
laying a factual foundation for the plea is connected with how a
judge talks with a defendant at sentencing. If a guidelines system
has an effect on the candor with which prosecutors and defense
attorneys talk with judges during plea discussions, and if judges
pull back from "knowing too much" in order to achieve plea
bargains that even the judges desire (though not permitted under
the guidelines), that, to me, would be a serious detriment to a
guidelines system. I would be interested in hearing more about the
relationship between sentencing guidelines and the plea bargaining
culture in jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guidelines.
advocates try to get around limitations on plea bargaining. See Knapp, supra note 1, at
694-95.
16. A fairly common complaint about guidelines systems is that the prosecutor gains
considerable power. This is because the way a case is charged-which is controlled by the
prosecutor-can directly translate into a specific sentence. See, e.g., Stephen C. Rathke,
Plea Negotiating Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 271, 279-84 (1982)
(observing that under Minnesota sentencing guidelines system prosecutors have more power
than they had previously).
